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Roula Khalaf, the FT’s Editor, curates her preferred articles for this periodical bulletin.
Twelve months into Donald Trump’s sophomore term as US president, Europe has absorbed the directive regarding assuming greater accountability for its self-protection. Expenditure on defense throughout Europe surged by nearly 80 percent in 2025 compared to the year prior to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, as stated by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference. Nonetheless, divergent perspectives have surfaced concerning the oversight of this shift. Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary-general, asserted recently that European leaders would be engaging in wishful thinking if they believed they could safeguard the continent absent American assistance. At the Munich gathering, Von der Leyen countered his remarks, asserting that the EU ought to activate its inherent collective defense provision. Fundamentally, she proposed the union as a substitute for Nato in ensuring safety.
Rutte’s perspective envisions European defense functioning as an integral component within Nato, rather than an independent body. He contends that the military coalition should establish benchmarks and objectives for capacities, while the EU maintains its forte in marshaling funds and managing industry oversight. Europe is compelled to acquire effective and presently necessary assets — even if this entails allocating European capital towards American weaponry.
Von der Leyen maintains that Europe must possess the ability to operate autonomously. Considering the uncertainties surrounding US pledges to Europe, exemplified by Trump’s declarations regarding Greenland, she posits that the EU must leverage European purchasing resources to bolster Europe’s industrial infrastructure, irrespective of potential irritation to Washington.
Both prominent figures, in reality, are correct. As achieving ‘strategic independence’ will necessitate years of synchronized endeavors for Europe, it must develop its capacities within Nato and meticulously oversee US dealings. Yet, the continent is obligated to advance with utmost speed and effectiveness towards a position where it can operate independently if circumstances demand. Navigating both avenues will demand a nuanced equilibrium; the Rutte-Von der Leyen ‘tough cop, gentle cop’ approach possesses advantages. Nonetheless, the Nato head’s ‘Patriarch Trump’ adulation can become excessive — a sentiment some leaders allegedly conveyed to him in Munich.
Furthermore, it is not illogical for the EU’s shared €150bn debt-financed Secure initiative to mandate 65 percent European composition and involvement from a minimum of two European nations in every undertaking. This constitutes merely a segment of the overall €800bn rearmament mobilization objective for 2030, with a substantial portion of the remainder sourced from national expenditures and loans.
Moreover, for Europe to forge the capacities it requires, it must prioritize multiple objectives. Firstly, its unified defense industrial foundation ought to extend far beyond the EU, encompassing the UK, Norway, Switzerland, and other states. Secondly, its most prominent nations, notably, must transcend their allegiance to domestic industry leaders and pursue authentic pan-European acquisition of the most superior and cost-effective systems. This necessitates a level of trust between states arguably even more profound than that required for currency sharing or the abolition of border checks.
A concurrent alteration in perspective is essential to guarantee that European nations are re-equipping to engage in — or discourage — the forthcoming conflict, rather than the previous one. High-ranking German authorities have been compelled to commit to directing increased capital towards innovation and nascent enterprises after critics and new market participants censured Berlin for allocating an excessive portion of its rearmament budget to traditional armaments like tanks, predominantly favoring incumbent weapons manufacturers.
As articulated by the Centre for European Policy Studies research institution, Europe must lessen reliance on the US by striving for strategic independence, especially in advanced military technologies — including missile defense systems, hypersonic armaments, and crucial facilitators such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Whether in preventing conflict in Europe or anticipating the future actions of Trump’s US, it is prudent to anticipate favorable outcomes, concurrently preparing for the most unfavorable.