Liverpool got here into the season as slight Premier League favorites, however it’s onerous to recollect a preseason favourite surrounded by so many query marks.
There was the tragic dying of Diogo Jota — a not-to-be-quantified loss that affected and continues to be affecting the group in methods we won’t start to know. After which there was all the things else, too.
Liverpool misplaced Trent Alexander-Arnold, maybe the best passer of the ball to ever stroll the Earth, to Actual Madrid. The pressing-and-pirouetting prowess of Luis Díaz departed for Bayern Munich. The assured chaos and likelihood creation of Darwin Núñez left for Saudi Arabia. Oh, and quite a few dependable backups discovered new houses, too: Harvey Elliott to Aston Villa, Kostas Tsimikas to AS Roma, Jarell Quansah to Bayer Leverkusen and Caoimhín Kelleher to Brentford.
After all, loads of expertise got here the opposite approach. Liverpool set the Premier League switch document twice, first for Florian Wirtz from Bayer Leverkusen, then for Alexander Isak from Newcastle United. The seemingly Isak-esque Hugo Ekitike was signed from Eintracht Frankfurt. A pair of younger new fullbacks joined: Wirtz’s Leverkusen teammate Jeremie Frimpong and AFC Bournemouth’s Milos Kerkez. A huge teenage middle again from Parma, Giovanni Leoni, signed to exchange Quansah. And Kelleher’s alternative, Giorgi Mamardashvili, formally joined after a yr on mortgage at Valencia.
For a group that moonwalked to a Premier League title and took the eventual UEFA Champions League winners to penalties final season, that is loads of turnover. We knew that the earlier roster was adequate to win the league and compete for the European Cup. Given the reputations of the gamers acquired and Liverpool’s player-acquisition prowess, we might predict that the brand new roster would even be adequate to do each, however we could not know it.
After 5 Premier League matches, it appeared like we knew the reply. Liverpool received all 5 and shortly constructed a five-point lead over second place, tied for the largest lead at that time within the season in league historical past. After which, after 9 video games, we knew the brand new reply, which was the other of the primary reply: they misplaced 4 straight matches for the primary time in 4 years, and out of the blue discovered themselves seven factors again of league-leading Arsenal.
The season was over — after which they performed their two finest video games of the season, a 2-0 victory over Aston Villa and a 1-0 smothering of a near-full-strength Actual Madrid. Whereas the entire new signings appeared to put the muse for the subsequent model of Liverpool, the membership would possibly’ve turned a nook by going again to what they had been doing final yr.
How unhealthy have Liverpool been thus far?
Here is how the Premier League stacks up by adjusted objective distinction, my most well-liked team-strength metric: a mix of 70% xG and 30% objectives.
You have bought Arsenal alone out entrance, then Manchester Metropolis alone in second, then Liverpool bunched up with a gaggle of groups that features Crystal Palace, Chelsea and Brighton & Hove Albion.
If we break that down by offense and protection, this is how Liverpool evaluate throughout the previous two seasons:
– Adjusted objectives scored: 2.22 in 2024-25, 1.75 in 25-26
– Adjusted objectives conceded: 1.04 in 2024-25, 1.29 in 25-26
If we minimize out the ultimate 4 video games of final season, after Liverpool clinched the title and when the gamers and supervisor had been partying in different nations as a substitute of practising, then Liverpool’s adjusted objectives conceded drops right down to 0.88.
Now, their schedule has been fairly tough. Per the betting-market-implied energy rankings from Pitch Rank, Liverpool have performed eight of the 12 finest groups within the Premier League, and the 2 video games towards golf equipment outdoors the highest 12 had been each on the highway.
However that is nonetheless not sufficient to elucidate the hole between final yr and this yr. There’s merely been a major decline — on each ends of the sphere.
What made them worse?
Provided that the supervisor continues to be Arne Slot, it is sensible to look into the personnel adjustments as the principle driver within the distinction between this season and final season. Here is the share of Premier League minutes performed by all of the departed gamers final season:
– Díaz: 70.1%
– Alexander-Arnold: 69.2%
– Jota: 35.0%
– Núñez: 33.1%
– Kelleher: 26.3%
– Tsimikas: 24.5%
– Quansah: 14.5%
– Elliott: 10.8%
And this is the way it seems to be for the brand new guys:
– Kerkez: 73.3%
– Wirtz: 67.4%
– Ekitike: 64.1%
– Mamardashvili: 40.0%
– Isak: 27.9%
– Frimpong: 9.6%
– Leoni: 0.0%
Past the entire ins and outs, there have been vital adjustments among the many gamers who had been on the group final season, too. Cody Gakpo has performed 88% of the league minutes after that includes in little greater than half of the minutes final yr. Dominik Szoboszlai has performed each minute after about three-quarters of the minutes final season. And Conor Bradley has leapt as much as about half of the minutes after taking part in simply over 20% final yr.
After which, within the different course, Andrew Robertson has seen the largest fall-off: simply over 1 / 4 of the minutes after taking part in almost 75% of the time final season. And whereas there aren’t any different main downshifts, there have been quite a few minor declines in the identical space of the sphere. Midfielders Ryan Gravenberch (from 90-plus p.c right down to about 75%), Curtis Jones (half the minutes to simply over a 3rd), and Alexis Mac Allister (about 75%, down to simply over 60%) have all been on the sphere much less typically.
So, broadly talking, this new and considerably worse model of Liverpool has featured quite a few various things: a left again aside from Robertson; a full again aside from Alexander-Arnold; a midfield regularly with out Mac Allister, Jones or Gravenberch; Gakpo being the ever-present left winger; and a brand new middle ahead.
There’s all the time going to be a brand new middle ahead, and Alexander-Arnold is not strolling via that door once more after a short return on Tuesday, however Liverpool’s return to kind up to now two matches has coincided with adjustments to a bunch of these adjustments. Robertson began each matches; final season’s backup proper again, Bradley, did the identical on the opposite facet. The midfield of Szoboszlai, Mac Allister and Gravenberch performed each minute aside from the few when Jones changed Mac Allister towards Madrid. And Gakpo solely performed about half of the minutes — or about as a lot as he did final season.
How a lot change is an excessive amount of change?
Should you have a look at Liverpool’s main personnel choices over the previous 10 months, they do not actually make lots of sense collectively. They signed their two 30-plus superstars, Virgil van Dijk and Mohamed Salah, to big-money contract extensions. They weren’t capable of maintain their 27-year-old celebrity, Alexander-Arnold. After which they signed outfield gamers this previous summer time who’re at the moment 26, 24, 23, 22, 21 and 18.
In different phrases, they’ve two extra years to get probably the most out of arguably the 2 finest gamers at their positions in Premier League historical past. And so they did simply spend extra money on switch charges in a single window than any membership within the historical past of the game. Nonetheless, nearly all of that cash went to gamers who nonetheless aren’t even in these prime years between 24 and 28 — Isak, 26, is the one one who actually matches the Salah and Van Dijk timeline.
As an alternative, it looks as if they tried to construct the subsequent nice Liverpool group whereas additionally hoping that these gamers would all have the ability to contribute to the ultimate years of the present nice Liverpool group. However the basis of even the strongest group can deal with solely so many adjustments without delay.
Soccer is a recreation of interdependencies — little relationships all throughout the sphere that in the end produce no matter it’s that we consider as a group’s type or ways.
2:01
Slot: A powerful win over an unbelievable Actual Madrid facet
Arne Slot heaps reward on Liverpool’s efficiency, particularly Conor Bradley, following their essential 1-0 win over Actual Madrid within the Champions League.
Liverpool received the league final season with a extra managed strategy than the one that they had below Jürgen Klopp. They did not dominate subject place as a lot as that they had up to now, they did not press as aggressively, and so they grew to become a greater defensive group regardless of permitting the opposition into their attacking third extra typically. They had been additionally capable of play this manner as a result of that they had a generational passing expertise in Alexander-Arnold, and the most effective participant on this planet for big stretches of the season in Salah — two gamers who can create the identical variety of alternatives even in case you give them fewer possessions.
Nonetheless, they had been additionally capable of play this manner due to their midfield, the one space the place Slot made a significant personnel change by putting in Gravenberch as a play-every-minute stalwart on the base. When you would not name any of the three midfielders elite passers or defenders, they had been all adequate at nearly each side of taking part in midfield: passing, transferring, carrying, urgent and recovering. This allowed Liverpool to defend deep, press excessive, spring quick assaults or develop measured long-string possessions.
However then they misplaced Alexander-Arnold and his passing from deep. Salah bought a yr older. Wirtz got here into the midfield and made it far more one-dimensional. Kerkez slid in as the brand new left again and whereas he can run, he is nowhere close to the passer Robertson is. Quite than being a typically contributor who largely crashed the again publish, Gakpo changed into a high-touch, high-volume winger as a starter. And whoever is taking part in up prime now, neither one in every of them can press in addition to Jota, Díaz or Núñez.
While you make one change — say, shedding Alexander-Arnold — you possibly can determine the way to account for it elsewhere on the sphere as a result of all the things else is staying the identical. However Liverpool misplaced Alexander-Arnold, changed Robertson, stopped utilizing final season’s midfield, turned a backup winger right into a beginning winger, and fully revamped the center-forward spot — all on the similar time.
It is not possible to know how all of these adjustments will have an effect on one another, however the clear outcome was a group that each could not management the ball prefer it used to and could not defend prefer it used to. For the entire attacking expertise on the sphere, Liverpool could not work the ball into the ultimate third as constantly as they did final season, in order that they generated fewer photographs and fewer touches contained in the field.
After which once they misplaced the ball, all of the opposition needed to do was hoof it lengthy and revenue. (Liverpool have confronted 62 lengthy balls per 90 minutes this season — a 15-pass enhance since final season, and probably the most any group has confronted in any of the previous 4 Premier League campaigns.)
The lineup Slot used towards Madrid, although, seems like the correct quantity of incremental change to maintain this group aggressive. This was towards one of many 5 finest groups on this planet, and the efficiency was even higher than the outcome:
The midfield of Mac Allister, Szoboszlai and Gravenberch is the one space of the group the place the entire gamers are at or proper earlier than their prime years. It was a energy final yr and it ought to proceed to be, particularly with Szobszlai wanting like he would possibly now be among the best gamers within the Premier League. That trio makes Liverpool simply sturdy sufficient with out the ball that they do not must completely dominate possession to face an opportunity, however the group can be technical sufficient to dominate possession.
Throughout the again 4, the middle backs are computerized selections at this level. Maybe due to the solidity offered by the midfield, Bradley had his two finest video games of the season — capable of make runs ahead to open up area for Salah, or to hold the ball ahead as a way of ball development. On the left, I am undecided Robertson can play each recreation, however he stays a greater possibility than Kerkez, who nonetheless is one thing of a wild card in possession and would not complement Bradley fairly as effectively on the opposite facet.
Throughout the entrance three, Wirtz won’t get the photographs for himself that Gakpo does, however he is a lot safer with the ball at his ft. Taking part in him as a part of the midfield turns Liverpool into a way more open transition-fest; taking part in him along with the midfield makes the group much more safe with the ball and simply opens up all types of recent alternatives to create probabilities. It is value noting that Wirtz did not take a shot towards Madrid, however he created 5 probabilities and was on the sphere for nearly all 17 of Liverpool’s photographs.
Whereas Salah doubtless won’t ever replicate what he did final season, he has proven some indicators of life over the earlier two matches, too. After making an attempt 19 take-ons and finishing simply 4 over the primary 11 Premier and Champions League video games, he tried 18 and accomplished 10 towards Madrid and Villa. Final yr, Liverpool’s move maps had been closely slanted towards Salah and Alexander-Arnold. Possibly what we noticed on Tuesday is what’s wanted to get probably the most out of Salah from right here on out:
Now, this is not to say that each one is fastened. It is solely two video games. The group nonetheless appears über reliant on the presence of Gravenberch to make the midfield work. Frimpong can be a very completely different proposition than Bradley, who hasn’t been capable of keep wholesome thus far in his younger profession. It is November and Salah’s attacking output is half of what it was final season. This setup squeezes out both Isak or Ekitike, and who is aware of what’ll occur if Van Dijk or Ibrahima Konaté get injured.
On prime of that, Villa and Madrid actually did not take a look at Liverpool’s obvious weak point towards the lengthy ball. And it is unlikely that Manchester Metropolis will both on Sunday.
However the group we have seen up to now couple of video games simply makes far more sense than what we noticed over the primary three chaotic months of the season. That was a totally completely different group than the one which did so effectively final yr. And whereas this present iteration does nonetheless really feel completely different, it is extra of an evolution from final season, moderately than one thing completely new.
I doubt, too, that that is what anybody on the membership had in thoughts come the tip of the summer time. In any other case, effectively, we most likely would’ve seen some model of this XI from the leap. You do not signal two strikers and an attacking midfielder in case your long-term plan is to play a formation the place the attacking midfielder slot is already occupied and there is room for just one ahead. This setup solely actually has room for 2 of the 5 new outfield signings. However the actuality of the scenario is that Salah and Van Dijk are nonetheless on the group, the midfield Slot selected final season was too good to interrupt up, and it was actually onerous to look at Tuesday’s match and never see a gaggle of 11 gamers who might problem for an additional Champions League title.
So, for now, Liverpool might need to look backward as a way to go ahead. There is a new model of this group hidden someplace inside this roster, one which will get a lot of the new guys on the sphere collectively and performs at a excessive stage. But it surely’s already November, and we nonetheless have not seen it.
As for the group that performed towards Madrid? We already know most of them are adequate.