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The address delivered by Marco Rubio to the Munich Global Security Summit on Saturday elicited applause from certain attendees, who rose to their feet. Has this led European leaders to conclude that past grievances are forgotten, and they now view the Trump administration favorably?
Far from it. Currently, it benefits both Europe and the United States to circumvent new conflicts. This largely accounts for the conciliatory tenor of the US Secretary of State’s address and the favorable response it received within the venue. However, the statements made by European heads of state in Munich — coupled with discussions with their staff — underscore that Rubio has not mended the division across the Atlantic. This divide is now poised to broaden and intensify — as European nations prepare their safeguards against the Trump administration, anticipating future upheavals.
A solitary address is insufficient to mend the harm inflicted over the previous twelve months. JD Vance’s offensive and confrontational remarks at the Munich conference last year established a precedent for a consistent decline in cross-Atlantic ties. Trump’s recent declarations regarding the annexation of Greenland intensified the perception in Europe that the present US administration functions as much as an antagonist as it does a confederate.
Although Rubio’s discourse was replete with saccharine accolades for Michelangelo and the Beatles — alongside an intriguing yearning for bygone European imperial dominance — its core message diverged little from Vance’s. Rubio’s entreaty for a revitalized alliance with Europe carried significant stipulations — specifically, that European leaders ought to adopt the ethno-nationalism espoused by the Maga movement.
The Trump administration evidently perceives its inherent European allies to be extreme right-wing and nationalist factions — namely, the Alternative for Germany, France’s Rassemblement National, Reform UK in Britain, and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary. These factions pose immediate dangers to Europe’s present governing bodies — and potentially to European democracy itself.
Events over the last year have also emphasized two crucial lessons across Europe. Foremost, during the Trump era, cross-Atlantic dealings are destined to careen from one predicament to another. The subsequent challenge might concern Greenland, commerce, Ukraine, or another matter. However, its arrival is certain. The second insight gained is that placating Trump constitutes an error. Europeans attempted this with commercial policy — acceding to US duties without reciprocal action. Yet, that choice conveyed vulnerability and provoked additional assaults. Regarding Greenland, a distinct strategy was adopted — presenting a unified front and asserting their readiness to retaliate. Trump then receded.
These occurrences do not imply that Europeans have resigned themselves to an exclusively antagonistic association with the US. The Nato pact continues to serve as the cornerstone of European safety. Should chances arise for constructive collaboration with the Trump administration on Ukraine or other subjects, these will be pursued. Nevertheless, European administrations are also now proactively striving to diminish their susceptibility to American influence.
Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, declared that “Europe needs to achieve greater autonomy . . . across all aspects impacting our safety and welfare.” Friedrich Merz, the German leader, articulated clearly that his nation is commencing deliberations on establishing a European nuclear deterrent — in collaboration with France and Britain — purely as a contingency, should America withdraw the nuclear protection it has extended over Europe for many decades. French President Emmanuel Macron advocated for an industrial strategy emphasizing “European priority” in sectors ranging from artificial intelligence to cloud computing. Keir Starmer from Britain underscored his government’s aspiration to foster closer ties with the EU single market and subtly remarked that Britain disavows the idea that individuals who “appear dissimilar” are incapable of coexisting harmoniously.
In addition to bolstering their safeguards against the Trump administration, Europeans are starting to contemplate offensive measures. In this regard, the sector to monitor is digital offerings — with Elon Musk’s X presenting a clear prospective objective. An initial move could involve adopting Australian-model age limitations for social media usage. The subsequent phase — more challenging and contentious — would entail requiring access to the foundational algorithms of social media platforms.
Evidently, grounds exist to question Europe’s capacity to act promptly and efficiently — especially considering the fierce US response anticipated if the EU confronts American tech behemoths.
Numerous present national administrations across Europe face significant political and financial difficulties. Macron, while still capable of delivering compelling addresses, finds himself politically weakened domestically. Starmer’s standing as head of the Labour Party and potential prime minister is jeopardized. Neither Britain nor France possesses ample funds to bolster their defense and manufacturing objectives. Merz presides over a cumbersome and progressively disfavored alliance.
Trans-European policy formulation is renowned for its sluggishness. The systemic obstacles stemming from Brexit considerably complicate cooperation between the UK and the EU. Ties between the French and German administrations are strained. Orbán’s Hungary frequently impedes unified European undertakings.
These challenges are all quite tangible. Nevertheless, Europe commands impressive economic, intellectual, and technological assets, should it manage to activate them. A crisis often compels Europeans to undertake arduous choices. Trump has engendered this feeling of emergency — and Rubio did nothing to mitigate it.
gideon.rachman@ft.com