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Authored by the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin
“A primary objective to avoid is the consolidation of Russia and China. I will need to disentangle their alliance,” Donald Trump declared boastfully while campaigning. Fourteen months into his second presidential tenure, Trump’s policies are yielding precisely contrary outcomes. The United States’ recent military conflict in the Middle East appears poised to elevate Beijing and Moscow’s uneven mutual reliance to an entirely unprecedented degree.
Although Vladimir Putin’s calamitous conflict in Ukraine has driven Moscow profoundly into Beijing’s sphere of influence—under Xi Jinping’s conditions—the bond between China and Russia seemed to be stabilizing in recent periods. Trade between the two nations reached its zenith in 2024 at $245bn, subsequently declining by 6.9 percent to $228bn in 2025. This downturn stemmed from a decrease in oil prices, which constitute the majority of Russian outbound trade, alongside diminished consumer interest in Chinese products among Russian families due to financial difficulties brought on by the conflict.
The Chinese capital appeared hesitant to deepen its dependence on Russian power resources. In 2025, Russia supplied 17.9 percent of China’s oil imports and 27.8 percent of its natural gas. China holds an advantageous position in this energy dynamic, as Western embargoes result in substantial price reductions. Nevertheless, financial strategists in Beijing have consistently championed expanding the variety of energy sources to enhance China’s energy stability, notwithstanding the Kremlin’s proposals for a Power of Siberia 2 gas conduit and supplementary cross-border oil lines. Up to this point, Xi has heeded this counsel.
The conflict initiated by Trump in the Middle East, coupled with the U.S. naval embargo on Venezuela, could alter this assessment. In 2025, Venezuela dispatched 80 percent of its unrefined petroleum to China, accounting for up to 4 percent of Beijing’s total oil acquisitions—a practice now ceased. Should deliveries to Beijing recommence, they would be rigorously regulated by the United States. Trump possesses the power to halt these supplies unilaterally. The conflict within the Gulf region presents an even more significant challenge. Iran provided 13 percent of China’s imported oil, and Beijing procures an additional 42 percent from other nations in the Gulf—virtually all of these consignments transiting the Strait of Hormuz, where maritime traffic has effectively ceased.
Ruin to the energy facilities in the Gulf region is escalating, and petroleum costs are again fluctuating near the $100 mark. Once the conflicts conclude, several months will be required to execute necessary mends and reinstate typical energy provisions. Furthermore, considering that the present conflict followed a 12-day war during the summer, Beijing must now prepare for a situation where Middle Eastern volatility becomes the standard state.
The Chinese economy remains acutely reliant on imported fossil fuels and is set to continue so for years ahead, notwithstanding Beijing’s progressive transition to renewable sources. Concurrently, China’s energy usage is anticipated to surge, propelled by advancements in artificial intelligence. In a global environment where tangible energy provisions hold growing significance, Russia presents itself as Beijing’s swiftest and clearest safeguard. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the fresh five-year economic advancement strategy approved by Beijing this week incorporates a new natural gas pipeline originating from Russia.
Should Xi endorse this undertaking, it could be finalized in less than five years, given its foundation lies in a group of extensively developed gas fields that previously supplied Europe. Further extensions of an onshore oil conduit can be brought to fruition even more rapidly.
Concurrently, the Russian government finds itself compelled to reroute its energy exports towards the east. It confronts escalating perils to its energy export facilities directed towards the west, such as Ukrainian assaults on oil terminals and vessels, in addition to the EU’s persistent endeavors to impound undeclared fleet ships.
China can rest assured that Russia will persist in selling its goods beneath prevailing market rates. The Russian government’s capacity to exploit its expanding market presence in China will be diminished due to Moscow lacking other significant proximate purchasers.
Regarding the menace of U.S. duties and punitive measures, Beijing possesses the countermeasure: its firm control over vital minerals, which Xi might deploy much like he did the previous year while contesting Trump’s tariffs. A rationale exists for why Trump imposed tariffs on India for acquiring Russian oil yet refrained from doing so with China, notwithstanding the latter being a larger purchaser.
Trump’s erratic policy decisions are impelling Russia into an unparalleled state of subservience to China. The exchange of energy denominated in renminbi, combined with Western punitive actions and China’s industrial supremacy, will afford the Kremlin scant alternatives other than to delve deeper into Beijing’s influence. This progression is detrimental for Russia yet beneficial for China. The pivotal strategic inquiry revolves around precisely how China intends to exercise its substantial influence over Russia and the potential global ramifications of such actions.