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A significant geopolitical realization has dawned upon Europeans: firstly, their profound reliance on other global actors for numerous crucial aspects of their existence; and secondly, the growing inclination of these actors to employ their dominance to dictate Europe’s course.
This apprehension initially surfaced concerning China, particularly with anxieties surrounding Huawei’s involvement in 5G infrastructure around a decade past. Susceptibility to Vladimir Putin’s control over energy supplies had been an early warning from nations bordering Russia, yet this only gained widespread recognition following his explicit exploitation of gas transactions in 2022.
Nonetheless, what has particularly astonished Europeans is the US’s alignment with those exploiting Europe’s reliance. The most flagrant economic instance involved Donald Trump’s harsh tariff warnings directed at nations resisting his attempted annexation of Greenland. Furthermore, Europeans keenly perceive their dependence on the US for crucial military technological provisions.
These instances (among others) collectively represent a catalogue of “critical junctions” – essential goods and service provisions where Europe finds itself vulnerable to manufacturers located beyond its borders. The exploitation of these points has left Europe bereft in economic, political, and even philosophical terms, given that Europeans had advocated and practiced economic interdependence more sincerely than any other global region.
European leaders are now acknowledging this new situation, uniting around concepts of self-sufficiency and endurance in an effort to loosen the grip others hold over them. This constitutes a purely protective response. Focusing exclusively on endurance obscures any contemplation of balancing authority that Europe itself holds and could deploy against others.
However, a more far-reaching concept is beginning to emerge. In a report from the prior year, stakeholders from policymaking and industry informed the Paris-based Institut Montaigne think-tank that they held less faith in attaining self-sufficiency than in cultivating European “essentiality,” particularly alongside trustworthy partners (who might or might not include the US).
The document determined: “Through cultivating European leadership in advanced semiconductor technologies, the EU has the capacity to establish critical junctures upon which others rely, thereby enhancing its geopolitical influence. Precisely, this would subsequently bolster European methods to prevent the enforcement of trade embargoes against Europe and potentially even military aggression from competing nations.’”
The relevant technologies pertain to Europe’s supremacy in extreme ultraviolet lithography, achieved via the Dutch firm ASML, and could, with appropriate policies, subsequently incorporate photonic and quantum chips, based on findings from the Institut Montaigne.
Europe commands a leading position in other areas as well. A consortium of specialists known as the Geostrategic Europe Taskforce, during the prior week, released a document that “pinpoints 41 vital bottlenecks where China relies upon the EU for over 80 percent of its imports, along with 67 similar dependencies for the United States. These encompass crucial components, encompassing insulin, therapeutic intermediates, medical technologies, and customized equipment for farming, paper manufacturing, and industrial processing.”
Furthermore, the German economic research institute Dezernat Zukunft recently unveiled a report, underscoring that “Europe possesses more advantages than it imagines. We manage 80 percent of US uranium imports. Siemens holds sway over the turbines that US data centers urgently require.”
These analysts render a significant contribution by demonstrating that Europe is better equipped for geopolitical confrontation than its leaders might believe. Merely identifying the tools one might employ represents an avenue towards a more decisive posture. These endeavors additionally provide several further insights for European leaders.
One is the necessity to expand one’s viewpoint from “overseeing alliances to exerting influence,” as articulated by the Geostrategic Europe Taskforce. Precisely, for the EU, this entails reducing the barrier for the “anti-coercion instrument” – which enables many forms of counteraction – so it can also be utilized to neutralize any threat before it emerges, instead of merely responding.
Another insight, as Dezernat Zukunft highlights, is that the issue extends beyond merely providing rare commodities. Operating as a significant consumer and economic market – where entry can be denied – also serves as a means of influence. A third point is that the EU and the UK must discover methods to coordinate on the utilization of critical junctions (similar to their agreement on sanctions against Russia).
This understanding is both beneficial and essential, yet it represents merely an initial stage. Influence, understood as possessing means of compulsion, is not equivalent to influence in the sense of effectively safeguarding one’s objectives. The second notion necessitates a readiness to employ the prior concept – potentially assertively. That is a move Europe’s political leaders still need to implement.
martin.sandbu@ft.com