US Air Force Adopts ‘Optionally Attritable’ Strategy for Collaborative Combat Aircraft
DAYTON, Ohio—The United States Air Force is solidifying its strategic approach to the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, defining a policy that allows these semi-autonomous drones to be either long-serving assets or intentionally risked and potentially lost in combat. This flexible stance, termed “optionally attritable,” signifies a refined position in the ongoing internal discussions regarding the design, role, and durability of these critical unmanned platforms.
Col. Timothy Helfrich, the portfolio acquisition executive for fighters and advanced aircraft, articulated this nuanced perspective on July 28 at the Life Cycle Industry Days conference. His comments provide clarity on the Air Force’s evolving vision for CCAs, which are engineered to operate alongside manned fighter jets as “loyal wingmen.” The adoption of an “optionally attritable” philosophy carries significant implications for the types of missions CCAs will undertake, their long-term sustainment requirements, and the future trajectory of air warfare tactics.
“We’ve actually never treated CCA as attritable,” Helfrich informed reporters, addressing a common misunderstanding. “We have treated CCA as optionally attritable.” This distinction highlights a strategic flexibility, emphasizing that the decision to risk a CCA is an operational choice made by a commander, rather than a fundamental design principle that dictates all drones are disposable by default.
Within the Pentagon, “attritable” describes military platforms that are relatively inexpensive, designed for mass production, and can be readily replaced if damaged or destroyed in combat. The CCA program’s genesis partly lies in Air Force initiatives to develop low-cost, attritable aircraft, with the aim of achieving “affordable mass”—a substantial increase in combat capability without the prohibitive costs associated with traditional manned platforms.
Early discussions surrounding the CCA concept often emphasized the attritable aspect. Former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, for example, stated in 2022 at the Center for a New American Security that these platforms needed to be cheaper and “at least attritable, if not expendable.” He contended that this approach would “open up a whole range of tactics that we currently would not contemplate because we’d be sacrificing manned aircraft, and we’re not going to do that.” This viewpoint underscored the potential for CCAs to perform high-risk missions deemed too perilous for human pilots.
Successive Air Force Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. and Gen. David W. Allvin, also voiced concerns about the potential for CCAs to become overly complex and expensive. In 2023, Brown warned that adding too much capability to a CCA would mean “this is no longer ‘attritable.’” In 2024, Allvin envisioned the CCA fleet as something that could be regularly refreshed with newer models rather than maintained for decades, thereby avoiding the extensive depot maintenance typically required for long-service aircraft. Allvin remarked, “I don’t want a set of Collaborative Combat Aircraft that’s going to last for 25 to 30 years,” suggesting that such longevity would necessitate intricate and costly design and sustainment.
However, this strong emphasis on disposability was not universally held, and a more nuanced perspective began to emerge. In 2023, Maj. Gen. Scott R. Jobe, then-director of plans, programs, and requirements at Air Combat Command, clarified that the notion of CCAs being completely attritable was a “common misconception.” This indicated an internal recognition that while cost-effectiveness remained paramount, outright disposability might not align with all potential mission profiles or the increasing technological investment in these platforms.
Col. Helfrich’s recent statements further solidify this balanced approach. He confirmed that CCAs could achieve a “very long service life, if they need to,” akin to traditional manned aircraft, but would also retain the flexibility to be “attritable if that’s what the operational commander needs to happen.” This allows operational commanders to make real-time decisions about deploying CCAs into high-threat environments, weighing the strategic value of a mission against the cost of potentially losing an unmanned asset. This position aligns with Air Force Secretary Troy Meink’s statement in June to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, where he noted, “I don’t know that any of those things would be considered truly attritable,” underscoring the significant capability embedded in these platforms.
While Col. Helfrich declined to discuss specific defensive systems that might be included on CCAs, he did offer updates on the program’s progress and cost-efficiency. Both General Atomics’ FQ-42A and Anduril Industries’ FQ-44A, which comprise the first increment of air-to-air CCAs, are reportedly exceeding the Air Force’s ambitious price goals. The target cost for these platforms is set at less than an F-35 fighter jet, which typically ranges around $30 million or less per unit, suggesting successful cost-control measures in their development phase.
Significant testing milestones have also been achieved recently. On July 15, the Air Force announced that Anduril’s developmental CCA, the YFQ-44A, successfully fired a live missile for the first time. General Atomics’ corresponding CCA is expected to conduct its own air-to-air weapons test within the next few months, marking crucial steps in validating their combat capabilities. Helfrich noted that while most weapons integration efforts are similar across both platforms, a key difference lies in their weapon carriage mechanisms: General Atomics’ CCA utilizes an internal weapons bay, whereas Anduril’s design relies on external under-wing mounts for its missiles.
Looking to the future, the CCA program is actively collaborating with industry partners and Air Combat Command to refine the precise requirements for the second increment, or next iteration, of CCAs. This process involves developing conceptual designs for these future platforms, with the concept refinement phase projected to conclude in approximately 10 months. Following this, the Air Force plans to narrow down the pool of potential vendors with workable designs to a select group of up to six companies.
A key characteristic of the CCA program’s acquisition strategy is its commitment to “continuous competition.” This approach ensures that companies not initially selected in earlier phases are not permanently excluded from future opportunities. Helfrich emphasized that the program could integrate new entrants later, even if they were not part of the initial concept refinement for Increment 2.
This philosophy is already evident in the development of mission autonomy software for Increment 1. In June, the Air Force selected three mission autonomy software vendors from an initial pool of six. While this group will be further narrowed down to a single winner over the next year, the competition is designed for continuous engagement. The Air Force plans a “fly-off” three years from now, inviting all six original vendors to load their mission autonomy software into CCAs for in-flight demonstrations. This innovative mechanism allows previously eliminated companies to re-compete, fostering ongoing innovation and potentially leading to the selection of a different provider for CCA’s first mission autonomy software.
Helfrich reiterated the importance of this competitive model for the program’s long-term success. “We will continue to maximize competition through all the phases of CCA increment two,” he stated. “We will not limit, going into the next phase, to just those vendors that we are doing concept refinement with right now. We will open back up to have competition.” This strategy aims to ensure the Air Force consistently gains access to the most advanced and cost-effective technologies for its future autonomous fleet.
Why This Matters
The U.S. Air Force’s adoption of an “optionally attritable” strategy for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program represents a pivotal shift in military aviation doctrine with far-reaching implications across strategic, tactical, economic, and technological domains. Understanding this nuanced approach is crucial for grasping the future trajectory of air power.
Tactical and Operational Flexibility:By defining CCAs as “optionally attritable,” the Air Force gains unprecedented tactical flexibility. Commanders can deploy these semi-autonomous drones into highly contested and dangerous environments, performing missions that would be too risky for manned aircraft. This reduces the threat to human pilots while allowing for persistent presence, reconnaissance, or even direct engagement in denied areas. It creates new possibilities for swarming tactics, overwhelming adversary defenses, and probing enemy airspaces without incurring human casualties, fundamentally altering the risk calculus of air combat.
Strategic Deterrence and Peer Competition:This strategy is particularly relevant in the context of great power competition, especially with nations like China and Russia. By developing a fleet of advanced, yet potentially expendable, unmanned assets, the U.S. signals a willingness to operate in environments that adversaries might deem too costly for traditional forces. This capability enhances deterrence by presenting a more complex and adaptable threat to potential adversaries, complicating their defensive planning and increasing the uncertainty of their response to U.S. actions. It accelerates the race for advanced autonomous warfare capabilities, prompting other nations to adapt their own doctrines.
Economic Efficiency and Industrial Innovation:The emphasis on cost-effectiveness, with CCAs projected to cost significantly less than manned fighter jets, allows the Air Force to achieve “affordable mass.” This means acquiring a larger number of platforms for a given budget, increasing overall combat power and readiness. The “continuous competition” model, allowing new vendors to enter or re-enter the program, fosters a dynamic industrial base. It incentivizes ongoing innovation, prevents vendor lock-in, and ensures the Air Force has access to the best available technologies, potentially driving down costs and speeding up development cycles across the defense industry.
Technological Advancement and Autonomy:The CCA program is a significant driver for advancements in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The development of sophisticated mission autonomy software, capable of allowing drones to operate semi-independently and collaboratively with manned aircraft, pushes the boundaries of current technology. The “fly-off” competition for autonomy software ensures continuous improvement and resilience in these critical systems. Success in this area will have spill-over effects into other defense technologies and potentially civilian applications for AI and robotics.
Future of Air Warfare and Personnel Adaptation:The integration of “loyal wingmen” fundamentally changes how air combat will be fought. It necessitates new doctrines, training methodologies for pilots who will command these drones, and alterations in command and control structures. The debate over their attritability also touches on the psychological aspects of warfare, where the “loss” of an unmanned asset, while not involving human life, still represents a significant investment and a potential data loss. The Air Force must adapt its personnel, infrastructure, and mindset to effectively leverage this new paradigm of human-machine teaming.