British-Made Naval Guns Predominantly Outfit US Fleet While Royal Navy Opts for Foreign Suppliers, Treasury Committee Hears
A parliamentary committee in the United Kingdom has been presented with evidence suggesting that naval guns manufactured by a British company are extensively deployed across the United States Navy and Coast Guard fleets, yet are rarely found on vessels of the Royal Navy. This observation was made during a Treasury Committee evidence session held on June 3, 2026, which focused on the intricate issues surrounding UK defence spending, financing mechanisms, and the interdepartmental relationships within Whitehall that govern defence procurement.
The session convened three prominent experts to offer their insights: Andrew Kinniburgh, the Director-General of Make UK Defence, a representative body for the UK’s manufacturing sector; Lucia Retter, Assistant Director for Defence and Security at RAND Europe, a non-profit global policy think tank; and Max Warner, a senior research economist from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, an independent research institute specializing in public policy.
During his testimony, Andrew Kinniburgh highlighted the case of MSI Defence Systems, a company based in Norfolk, UK, which specializes in the production of naval gun mountings. Kinniburgh used this example to underscore his broader argument that the United Kingdom possesses significant, yet underutilized, defence industrial capabilities. He asserted that MSI Defence Systems’ products, specifically its small-calibre stabilised mounts designed for close-in defence against various threats such as fast attack craft, are fitted to “almost all” US Navy and Coast Guard ships. In stark contrast, Kinniburgh noted that the Royal Navy typically procures the Bofors gun, a system manufactured in Sweden, for its own vessels.
This point was integral to Kinniburgh’s overarching contention that, as defence spending potentially increases, the UK does not necessarily need to develop new capabilities from scratch or heavily rely on imports. Instead, he argued, the nation could more effectively leverage existing expertise and manufacturing capacity within British companies that are currently not being fully engaged domestically. The widespread adoption of MSI Defence Systems’ guns by the United States military, he suggested, serves as a prime illustration of this untapped national industrial strength.
When questioned by committee members regarding the scalability of such a firm—specifically, whether MSI Defence Systems could rapidly pivot to supply the Royal Navy, given its existing high-volume production for international clients—Kinniburgh expressed confidence. He indicated that the company would likely encounter “little difficulty” in scaling up to meet additional domestic demand. He elaborated that the sheer volume of guns currently produced for the United States military is so substantial that the incremental quantity required for the Royal Navy would be comparatively minor, thus posing a manageable increase to existing production lines and capacities.
The Treasury Committee’s inquiry into defence spending and finance aims to scrutinize how public funds are allocated for national security, the efficiency of procurement processes, and the strategic alignment between the Ministry of Defence and other government departments. The testimony from experts like Kinniburgh provides critical perspectives on the economic and industrial dimensions of defence policy, prompting a deeper examination of the UK’s approach to supporting its domestic defence industrial base.
Why This Matters
The discrepancy in procurement highlighted by Andrew Kinniburgh before the Treasury Committee carries significant implications across several dimensions, ranging from national security and economic prosperity to industrial strategy and international relations.
Firstly, it raises fundamental questions about the UK’s **sovereign defence capability and industrial base**. If British companies are producing world-class defence equipment that is highly valued by key allies like the United States, but largely overlooked by the UK’s own armed forces, it suggests a potential misalignment in procurement priorities. A robust domestic defence industry is often seen as vital for national security, ensuring reliable supply chains, fostering innovation, and reducing reliance on foreign entities, particularly during times of geopolitical instability. Maximizing the use of domestic products could strengthen the UK’s manufacturing sector, secure high-skilled jobs, and contribute to economic growth.
Secondly, the issue touches upon **defence procurement policy and efficiency**. The Royal Navy’s choice of foreign-made Bofors guns over domestically produced alternatives warrants examination. While capability, cost-effectiveness, and interoperability are crucial factors in procurement decisions, the wider economic and industrial benefits of buying British often form part of a holistic assessment. This situation prompts a review of whether current procurement frameworks adequately balance immediate operational needs with long-term strategic objectives for the UK’s industrial base.
Thirdly, there are **economic and regional considerations**. A company like MSI Defence Systems in Norfolk represents local employment and economic activity. Increased domestic orders could lead to further investment, job creation, and technological advancements within the UK. The testimony underscores the potential for the defence sector to act as an economic engine, particularly in regions with established manufacturing capabilities, if government policy actively supports domestic sourcing where feasible and competitive.
Finally, this scenario reflects the complex reality of **allied defence cooperation and global supply chains**. While the fact that the US Navy relies heavily on a British company for critical components demonstrates strong defence industrial ties between the two nations, it also highlights an asymmetry. If the UK is an exporter of advanced defence technology to its closest ally, but chooses to import similar capabilities, it invites scrutiny regarding strategic consistency and the potential for a “buy British” impetus to be stronger among allies than at home. As global defence spending increases and geopolitical tensions evolve, a clear, consistent, and strategically informed approach to defence industrial policy becomes ever more critical for the UK’s security and prosperity.