In an opinion piece published 13 March for UK Defence Journal, I inquired: ‘What next for the UK–US special relationship?’ Given recent developments, the more urgent question now is whether it is time to re-evaluate it.
Since that time, President Trump’s unreserved and persistent censure of the UK has endured. He initially claimed he did not need the Royal Navy, or other partner vessels, to help secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz, then sought their support, only to later disparage British aircraft carriers as ‘toys’.
The President has also menaced withdrawal, stating that events in the Gulf hold no bearing on the US and others can resolve the repercussions of his actions. He persistently disparages the contributions of the UK and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, it is not solely his doing. His inner circle of advisers, including the Vice President, Secretary of Defence/War, and Secretary of State, mirror his stance. All also continue to disseminate falsehoods about NATO and how partner nations have supposedly never offered assistance to the US.
Anyone acquainted with history knows that is manifestly false. The sole instance NATO’s Article 5 has ever been activated was by the United States after 9/11. The US did not provide aid to the UK’s (and incidentally, Israel’s) position in Suez (setting aside the validity of that conflict). Justifiable concerns exist regarding US backing for the UK during the Falklands War (indeed, the US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, strenuously championed Argentina).
Concurrently, the President has rescinded petroleum sanctions on Russia and Iran (the very country they are in conflict with!!!). Rational thought, prudence, and support for allies do not appear to be hallmarks of this administration. And it will require a considerable period for the US to regain what it squandered in an instant.
And it is striking that those in UK politics and on social media who were most vociferous, insisting that the UK back the US in a conflict about which we were not privy to prior discussion and do not concur on the lawfulness of, have now gone noticeably subdued. This is predictable, as the financial repercussions of the conflict are genuinely beginning to adversely affect the UK. Oil, petrol, gas, and electricity prices are on an escalating trajectory. Yet, matters have the prospect of significant deterioration.
Should this conflict persist, food prices are also on a rising trend. Farmers I know in the UK are already indicating that this will be a consequence stemming from both the rise in fuel and energy, and also the increase in fertiliser costs. Situations have the capacity for severe exacerbation. All as a result of decisions made by the US and Israel, seemingly lacking a coherent strategy or long-range foresight.
But what then concerning the Special Relationship?
As I noted in my earlier commentary: ‘In reality, questions have existed regarding the character and resilience of the “Special Relationship” for many years, posed by numerous US administrations. Some of these are legitimate inquiries focused on the UK’s reluctance to invest in defence or assert itself at critical junctures. Therefore, let’s not assume these questions are recent developments.’
When I was involved with Iraq, there were instances when personnel in the State Department and Department of Defense challenged the UK’s capacity or dedication to that conflict. They would frequently reference what we did (or, in their view, did not do in Basra). This prompted some rather intense debates (in which I participated) concerning the UK ‘abandoning its responsibilities’. So, let us not become too naïve or idealistic about this connection.
Perhaps all we are witnessing now is a harsher and more unvarnished revelation of what many in the US have long perceived: that the Special Relationship is contingent upon our adherence to their desires, and that UK concerns are largely secondary.
Maybe President Trump and his associates have rendered us a service by unambiguously exposing the contempt within the US system for the UK.
Contempt which is not entirely unjustifiable.
The UK drastically cut defence spending at the conclusion of the Cold War to secure a ‘peace dividend’. Despite subsequent governmental assertions, our military capacity on land, sea, and in the air is considerably diminished from what it was even a decade ago.
We do not allocate sufficient funds to defence because, in many respects, it is unfavorable among voters who desire improved social services and a better NHS, for instance. And successive UK governments have placed greater emphasis on such spending over military expenditure, assured by the assumption that the US would always compensate for the shortfall.
That comforting assumption has been utterly discredited by the Trump administration.
But, as I state, perhaps they have provided a benefit. Maybe it is time for us to internalize the lesson that if we wish to be regarded with gravitas, we need to behave responsibly and invest in cultivating genuine capacities. To perhaps recognize that our future in defence lies with Europe, not an undependable and faithless US.
Brexit has also eroded our standing in fiscal, economic, and political spheres. A pivotal element of the Special Relationship was the fact that both the US and mainland Europe viewed us as a liaison and channel to the other. We deliberately relinquished this role and thereby diminished our significance, especially to the US.
It is time for us, therefore, to acknowledge that our relationship with the US is akin to that with any other nation, determine a course of action with our European neighbours, who are currently more aligned with our principles, and increase our military expenditure. The Special Relationship is merely rhetorical under this administration. Let’s accept that and devise our subsequent steps.
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