May 5, 2026
Many failures in government software programs are attributed not to technical deficiencies in the software itself, but rather to fundamental issues within the acquisition process that governs their development and deployment.
This perspective is central to Bryon Kroger, founder and CEO of Rise8, whose career trajectory was significantly shaped by a single incident during his time as a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer. While investigating a software failure in targeting operations, Kroger discovered that the root cause lay in requirements that had been drafted eight years prior to the incident. Development of the software had concluded a year before the operational failure, but the completed system remained in a holding pattern, awaiting a critical Authorization to Operate (ATO).
“I felt like the acquisition process in this case actually got people killed,” Kroger stated at a recent Air & Space Forces Association (AFA) panel discussion on acquisition reform. This profound experience prompted his shift from intelligence operations to the acquisitions field, where he co-founded Kessel Run, the Department of War’s (DoW) pioneering software factory. He later established Rise8, an organization focused on modernizing software delivery for government agencies.
Kroger’s central argument, detailed in the “Software Factory 2.0” whitepaper, asserts that the DoW’s current method of acquiring software is fundamentally incompatible with contemporary software development and delivery methodologies. He contends that while the necessary tools and approaches for reform exist, they are largely underutilized by most acquisition offices.
**Understanding the Existing System for Effective Reform**
A core principle for meaningful reform, according to Kroger, is a thorough understanding of the existing system, allowing innovators to work within its established frameworks. At the AFA panel, Kroger recounted how Kessel Run strategically designed its initial programs to mirror traditional DoW 5000 acquisition pathways, incorporating familiar milestones. The crucial distinction, however, lay in the execution: traditional milestone reviews were replaced with venture capital-style growth boards, which prioritized tangible outcomes.
“We made it look exactly like the old thing,” Kroger explained, emphasizing that “communicating in the language of the existing system can help you move through it.” He referenced acquisition reform author Dan Ward, whose writings on the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are influential within the acquisition innovation community. Ward’s premise, echoed by Kroger, is that “Ignorance of the FAR is a greater barrier to innovation than the FAR itself,” suggesting that the FAR provides more inherent flexibility than many organizations recognize.
The deeper challenge, as Kroger identifies it, is structural, characterized by what he terms “water-scrum-fall.” This describes a scenario where agile development methodologies, such as sprints, are employed internally by teams, yet remain constrained by rigid, bureaucratic acquisition processes at both the initiation and deployment stages. Contracts, for instance, are often negotiated over extended periods—12 to 18 months—using procedures originally designed for hardware procurement. Requirements are frequently locked in before significant user interaction, and progress is measured by document generation rather than functional software. Consequently, by the time systems receive authorization, the operational needs they were designed to address may have already evolved.
Early software factories demonstrated the potential benefits of reduced acquisition constraints. Kessel Run successfully deployed five applications for operational use in an average of 124 days, achieving an 85 percent reduction in typical development timelines. Similarly, Section 31, the Space Force’s inaugural software factory, delivered eight applications in an average of 64 days, significantly reducing conjunction analysis timelines from three hours to 15 minutes. These initiatives proved the DoW’s capacity to deliver at mission speed through innovative acquisition approaches.
However, these initial successes proved difficult to sustain. The “SWF 2.0” whitepaper notes that leadership rotations frequently disrupted continuity, teams were often redirected to unrelated missions, and contracts reverted from outcome-based delivery models to staff augmentation. The whitepaper concludes that “The same repeatable, avoidable patterns undermined both software factories.”
**Recommendations for Structural Reform**
Kroger’s primary recommendation is unequivocal: failing contracts should be terminated. “Programs of record is a very loose term,” he stated. “Program dollars are tied to requirements, not contracts. If you have a failing contract, that is not a program of record. That is a contract, and you should cancel it.”
He further advocates for consolidating multiple budget activity codes under a single program element. This approach is intended to enable flexible funding across an entire portfolio, allowing resources to be reallocated towards successful initiatives and away from underperforming ones. This reallocation process would be guided by quarterly growth boards. The SWF 2.0 framework formalizes this strategy through a three-horizon investment model: dedicating 75 percent of resources to capabilities already in production, 15 percent to prototypes ready for scaling, and 10 percent to high-potential exploratory efforts.
**Shifting to Outcome-Based Contracting**
The whitepaper strongly advocates for a transition from activity-based contracting to a model centered on outcome-oriented delivery. This shift would involve structuring contracts around mission value streams, utilizing domain-driven design principles, rather than aligning them with organizational charts. The focus would be on favoring dedicated delivery teams over mere staff augmentation, with success measured by the deployment of working software into production that demonstrates tangible mission impact.
“Efficiency without efficacy is waste,” Kroger asserted at the panel. “You’re doing a thing really well that shouldn’t be done at all.” He argues that the DoW remains largely in an exploratory phase regarding software acquisition, attempting to identify effective approaches, yet it continues to apply “exploit-phase” metrics—such as cost, schedule, and earned value—to programs that have not yet proven their capability to deliver functional software into production.
Kroger’s proposed standard includes achieving production deployment within 180 days or less, followed by continuous software delivery on a weekly cadence. Performance measurement would leverage DORA (DevOps Research and Assessment) metrics—deployment frequency, lead time for changes, mean time to restore, and change failure rate—alongside specific mission indicators. The underlying principle is that genuine learning and iteration cannot occur until software is actively used in production by real users with real data.
**Leveraging Existing Statutory Tools**
The mechanisms required for faster and more effective software acquisition are not theoretical; they are already embedded within existing statutory frameworks. Authorities such as Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs), provisions within Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Parts 12 and 13, and SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) Phase III have been available for several years but remain underutilized.
Rise8, for example, holds an AFWERX Software Delivery Organization (SDO) IDIQ (Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity) contract awarded under SBIR Phase III authority. Under 15 U.S.C. Section 638, the original Phase I and Phase II awards satisfy the competition requirement for this vehicle. Consequently, task orders issued under this authority do not necessitate new competition, Justification and Approval (J&A) documents, market research, or public notice. This vehicle possesses a $499 million ceiling, is accessible to any federal agency, and can facilitate contract awards in approximately 30 days.
This approach has yielded significant results. The Department of Veterans Affairs utilized this vehicle to become the first non-DoD agency to achieve continuous ATO, reducing authorization times from 568 days to 90 days. The Space Force reported a 20 percent increase in scheduling throughput and savings of over 34,000 hours. The Air Force brought 12 applications into full CYBERCOM compliance and recovered more than 1,000 developer hours.
Ultimately, accelerating acquisition is not solely about speed, but about ensuring that critical capabilities are delivered at the rapid pace demanded by evolving missions.
**Why This Matters**
The efficiency and effectiveness of government software acquisition have profound implications far beyond procurement offices. In an increasingly digital world, national security, economic competitiveness, and the delivery of essential public services depend on reliable, up-to-date software systems. When acquisition processes are slow, bureaucratic, and misaligned with modern development practices, several critical issues arise:
- National Security Risk: Delays in deploying cutting-edge software for defense and intelligence agencies can leave nations vulnerable to adversaries who leverage more agile technological innovation. Obsolete systems can hamper military readiness, intelligence gathering, and cyber defense capabilities, directly impacting troop safety and strategic advantage.
- Taxpayer Waste: Failing software projects, prolonged development cycles, and systems that become outdated before deployment represent a significant misallocation of taxpayer funds. When billions are spent on programs that deliver little to no operational value, public trust erodes, and resources are diverted from other critical needs.
- Operational Inefficiency: Government agencies, from defense to healthcare, rely on software to manage complex operations, process data, and serve citizens. Inefficient software acquisition leads to agencies operating with suboptimal tools, resulting in slower service delivery, increased manual workloads, and reduced overall productivity.
- Erosion of Innovation: Rigid acquisition systems stifle innovation both within government and among private sector contractors. Companies with innovative solutions may be deterred from working with government due to overly complex and time-consuming procurement hurdles. This perpetuates a cycle where the government struggles to access the best available technology.
- Mission Success: Ultimately, the ability to rapidly acquire and deploy effective software directly correlates with mission success. Whether it’s providing critical intelligence, managing space assets, or delivering veteran benefits, the agility of software acquisition determines whether agencies can meet their mandates effectively in a dynamic environment.
Reforming software acquisition, as advocated by experts like Bryon Kroger, is not merely an administrative tweak; it is a strategic imperative. By adopting outcome-based contracting, leveraging existing flexible authorities, and prioritizing working software over bureaucratic milestones, governments can ensure they are equipped with the tools necessary to protect national interests, serve citizens efficiently, and remain at the forefront of technological advancement.