London, UK – A new analysis from the Council on Geostrategy, a UK-based think tank, warns that NATO’s crucial supply lines across Europe, particularly in the strategically vital “Wider North,” are dangerously exposed to potential strike and sabotage. The report suggests that without urgent remediation, the alliance faces a significant risk of frontline collapse in the event of a major conflict, jeopardizing its ability to sustain operations and reinforce forces.
The primer, titled “Sustainment under Strike and Sabotage: Contested Logistics in the Wider North,” posits that the long-held assumption of a secure and permissive environment for logistics operations throughout Europe is no longer valid. Authored by William Freer, Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, and Charlotte Kleberg, Director at Wallenius Lines and an Adjunct Fellow at the organization, the paper underscores that failures in securing these vital arteries could lead to severe delays in reinforcement, substantial pre-battle attrition of critical assets, and a potentially catastrophic erosion of combat effectiveness at the front lines.
The “Wider North” region, as defined in the report, encompasses the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland). Its strategic importance has surged in recent years due to renewed great power competition and the expansion of NATO to include Sweden and Finland, significantly extending the alliance’s northern flank. This vast area, characterized by challenging geography and critical maritime routes, is identified as a primary concern for logistical vulnerabilities.
The analysis meticulously outlines four core challenges that critically undermine NATO’s logistics posture in this crucial region. Firstly, **geographic chokepoints** present inherent vulnerabilities. The Nordic region features numerous narrow straits, fjords, and land corridors that are easily targeted, potentially disrupting the flow of goods and personnel. Such chokepoints, whether maritime or terrestrial, can be blocked or interdicted, severing supply routes and isolating forces.
Secondly, the report highlights **thin lift margins**. This refers to the insufficient capacity within NATO’s current logistical framework for the rapid and large-scale transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Decades of underinvestment following the Cold War “peace dividend” led to a reduction in military transport assets and a greater reliance on commercial shipping and aviation. This reliance, while cost-effective in peacetime, is ill-suited for the rapid deployment and sustained resupply required in a high-intensity conflict scenario, especially under duress.
The third challenge identified is the **limited militarily useful infrastructure**. Much of Europe’s infrastructure, though extensive, was not designed or maintained with large-scale military movements in mind. Ports, railways, roads, and airfields often lack the necessary capacity, hardening, or redundancy to support massive military deployments and sustainment operations. Bridges may not bear the weight of modern armored vehicles, rail lines may not be compatible across national borders, and crucial fuel depots or ammunition storage facilities may be exposed and unprotected.
Finally, the primer points to a **critical lack of dedicated defenses for supply lines**. Unlike the Cold War era, where extensive plans and assets were dedicated to protecting logistics convoys and hubs, contemporary NATO forces largely lack specialized units for this purpose. This leaves vital supply routes, storage facilities, and transport nodes vulnerable to a range of threats, including drone strikes, long-range missile attacks, and sophisticated sabotage operations by adversary special forces.
These findings emerge against a backdrop of escalating concern regarding the vulnerability of European infrastructure. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 served as a stark wake-up call, exposing how decades of post-Cold War underinvestment and an over-reliance on “just-in-time” commercial logistics models have left supply chains across the continent dangerously exposed. The commercial “just-in-time” model, optimized for efficiency and minimal inventory, offers little resilience or redundancy in the face of widespread disruption.
To illustrate the scale of the sustainment problem, the primer draws parallels with declassified Cold War planning assumptions. In the 1980s, the British Army estimated that a single division with four artillery battalions would consume approximately 35,000 155mm shells per day. A deployed corps, a larger formation, could therefore burn through tens of thousands of rounds daily. In stark contrast, Ukraine, currently engaged in active warfare, is estimated to be firing around 5,000 shells per day – a figure largely constrained not by its own demand, but by the limited production capacity and stockpiles of its NATO allies.
The paper also addresses the complexities of reinforcement. While NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence has seen the deployment of a brigade in Lithuania, a brigade in Latvia, and a battlegroup in Estonia, there are currently no permanently forward-deployed forces of similar scale in Norway, Sweden, or Finland. Reinforcing these nations, or rapidly deploying larger corps-level formations such as the UK-based Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), would present immense challenges, especially if undertaken under contested conditions where an adversary actively seeks to disrupt movements.
In response to these critical vulnerabilities, the authors propose a series of urgent recommendations for NATO. These include integrating commercial capacity more effectively into military planning, ensuring that civilian transport and infrastructure can be rapidly mobilized and utilized in a crisis. They also advocate for hardening critical infrastructure, which involves physically protecting key logistical nodes, enhancing their resilience to attack, and building in redundancy. Establishing dedicated logistics defenses is another key recommendation, suggesting the creation of specialized units and capabilities focused solely on protecting supply lines.
Furthermore, the report calls for embedding contested logistics assumptions into all NATO exercises, moving beyond simulations that presume a safe environment. This would ensure that forces are trained to operate and sustain themselves while under constant threat. Finally, the authors urge the establishment of mobile air defense and counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) forces specifically tasked with protecting supply lines, recognizing the pervasive threat posed by drones and aerial bombardment in modern conflict.
Why This Matters
The Council on Geostrategy’s primer highlights a fundamental vulnerability that could profoundly impact NATO’s ability to deter aggression and defend its member states. Effective logistics are the lifeblood of any modern military operation; without them, even the most advanced fighting forces are rendered ineffective. This report underscores that post-Cold War assumptions about supply chain security are dangerously outdated, particularly in an era of renewed great power competition and hybrid warfare tactics that include sabotage and long-range precision strikes.
Addressing these logistical shortcomings is not merely a military concern; it has far-reaching geopolitical and economic implications. A NATO unable to rapidly reinforce and resupply its forces would diminish its deterrence posture, potentially emboldening adversaries. Moreover, the disruption of critical infrastructure, even if initially targeting military logistics, would inevitably spill over into civilian life, affecting international trade, energy supplies, and daily commerce across Europe. The recommendations in this report represent a call for a fundamental shift in strategic thinking and investment, emphasizing the urgent need for NATO and its member states to prioritize the resilience and protection of their logistical networks to safeguard collective security and stability in a more volatile world.