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Pentagon executives, keen to proceed swiftly and circumvent the postponements and expense escalation that often afflict extensive government initiatives, are authorizing personnel operating outside conventional frameworks with powers and supervision for some of the most notable military programs ever recorded.
However, the four-star generals from the Air Force and Space Force undertaking these duties indicate that they do not intend for this unusual arrangement to represent a lasting alteration to the system.
These Direct Reporting Program Managers, or DRPMs (pronounced DER-pums in Pentagon parlance), are still relatively new in their positions. Yet, their presence is already garnering commendation and criticism from former Pentagon officials and experts who conversed with Air & Space Forces Magazine.
The Trump administration launched its inaugural DRPM as a method to manage the vast Golden Dome missile defense endeavor, which encompasses elements across numerous agencies and services. They appointed Space Force Gen. Michael A. Guetlein, a seasoned acquisition specialist, to serve as the DRPM for Golden Dome, reporting directly to Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg.
Subsequently, late last year, officials broadened the concept. Four of the Air Force’s largest, riskiest programs—the F-47 fighter, B-21 bomber, VC-25B Air Force One, and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system—were consolidated under the designation of “Critical Major Weapons Systems,” and placed under the vigilant eye of Gen. Dale R. White, the DRPM for all of them. Now the Navy also has a DRPM: Vice Adm. Robert Gaucher oversees submarine production and reports to the Deputy Secretary.
Both Guetlein and White downplayed the idea that DRPMs are now destined to endure as permanent roles during appearances at the McAleese Defense Programs Conference in mid-March.
“We are actually planning to disband the DRPM concept once we get the momentum and get the capability into the field, and fold that back into the services and into the agencies,” Guetlein said of Golden Dome. “When we stood up the manpower documents and everything, everything for Golden Dome is temporary. There is not an enduring manpower document or any of that kind of stuff going forward. So the intent is to stand down at some point in the future.”
White was less explicit, but he did say “the ideal world would be, you don’t need a DRPM.”
“My idea going into this was not to try to go around the system, but to work within the system as much as I can,” White added. “And everything I do is in partnership with the current Air Force acquisition structure.”
Too Crucial to Fail
This notion of a provisional, high-level figure to guide these vital programs to an initial operational stage makes sense given Deputy Secretary Feinberg’s business background, stated Todd Harrison, a long-standing budget analyst with the American Enterprise Institute.
“That is kind of a private equity model. … What they’re doing is they’re taking these kind of core programs and saying ‘they’re too important to fail, but we’re worried that they’re on a path to failure, so we’re going to give them special attention, we’re going to rehabilitate them,’” Harrison said. “‘And if things go well, then they can move back and the service can take them over again. If it doesn’t go well, we’re going to have to find a new construct.”
Guetlein and White may be uniquely suited to provide the specific focus required. White has dedicated much of the past decade to overseeing some of the programs currently in his portfolio, including B-21 and F-47, and has spent time at nearly every significant Air Force acquisition and development organization, including the Rapid Capabilities Office. Matt Donovan, who held several Pentagon positions in the first Trump administration, including Undersecretary of the Air Force, characterized White as a “unicorn” in that regard.
Guetlein similarly possesses extensive expertise ranging from Space Systems Command to the National Reconnaissance Office to the Missile Defense Agency to Headquarters Air Force.
The major challenge both generals now encounter is whether they can efficiently operate within the existing acquisition system—a system that Pentagon officials, legislators, and analysts have long criticized and sought to reform.
Even now, as the DRPMs commence their duties, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has embarked on an ambitious initiative to streamline the weapons development and acquisition process. Many components, such as dismantling the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and delegating certain acquisition program decisions, have redirected authorities back to the services.
“It certainly strikes me as something that makes sense if the current acquisition process isn’t working well, which I think most of us can agree that it’s too slow and it takes too long. But there’s a lot of pieces to [consider],” Donovan said.
Line of Authority
A significant aspect to consider is how the DRPMs exist and interact within the standard line of authority, which ascends through the service chief and department secretary.
Both Guetlein and White now outrank the three-star officers who command their services’ primary acquisition divisions, Air Force Materiel Command and Space Systems Command. And by reporting to the Deputy Secretary, they are no longer answerable to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration.
“It cuts out the whole chain of command for the services,” said former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, who was a service secretary for the Biden administration and headed Defense Department acquisition during the Obama years. “I don’t know how they get around the statutes that require programs to report through a program executive officer, through the acquisition executive in the military department, to the Defense Department’s acquisition executive. … So it creates a very awkward chain, a double chain of command for people.”
Donovan similarly contended that the DRPM framework appears to marginalize the services’ role in acquisition.
“I wonder if this is really diluting the authority of the of the service secretaries. I think it’s obvious that it is. In what way, we’re not sure,” Donovan said. “But when you take a look at the service acquisition executives, I don’t even think they have confirmed [assistant secretaries.]”
Indeed, the Trump administration has yet to nominate a permanent Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration. It’s not the longest period these positions have been vacant, but both Donovan and Kendall questioned whether the administration will be able to find qualified and interested nominees given how the jobs’ responsibilities have shifted.
Harrison, however, asserted that circumventing the typical line of authority isn’t a drawback—it’s an essential characteristic.
“In the traditional acquisition organization, these decisions are made down at lower-level program offices, and it has to percolate up,” he said. “And if there’s some sort of controversy in the decision and not everyone’s willing to sign off, it could take forever for the decision to get all the way up to someone like the Deputy Secretary that can just say, ‘This is what we’re doing.’ And so I think they’re bypassing that organizational, bureaucratic inertia with these these new organizations.”
White, for his part, seemed to contend that he’s not operating too far outside the service chain
of command. He said he maintains a close association with current Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink—pointing out that their workplaces are merely steps apart within the Pentagon.
“One must exercise caution regarding the extent of power entrusted to me. Such power could be wielded as a weapon, a path I have definitively opted against,” he remarked. “Indeed, I elect to invoke these powers solely when absolutely necessary. Most often, I’ve observed the system’s readiness to adapt and cooperate with me to ensure our objectives are accomplished.”
Efficient and Nimble
Beyond the chain of command inquiries, the DRPMs encounter an additional challenge within the existing framework: preventing administrative excess.
White stated that he endeavors to guarantee the DRPM office does not duplicate efforts already underway elsewhere, by restricting the number of personnel in his department.
“I was granted authorization for a considerable number of staff, and my transition lead, a phenomenal colonel, is exceptional,” White commented. “As we began assembling the team, I told her, ‘Alright, here’s the agreement. For the staff formation, no more than 20.’ And she reacted with, ‘What do you mean, no more than 20?’ I replied, ‘Approximately 10,000 individuals are involved with these initiatives. We don’t require any more.’”
They have largely adhered to that objective, White indicated, with 24 individuals in his department and no intentions for further expansion.
Guetlein’s role differs—it inherently brings together numerous distinct components from the Army, Missile Defense Agency, Space Force, and other entities, with the explicit aim of ensuring their seamless integration and collaborative function. Yet, akin to White, Guetlein affirmed his goal is to prevent redundant activities.
“Upon establishing the Golden Dome office, we structured it to be exceptionally streamlined and productive,” he explained. “Consequently, I oversee a very flat organizational hierarchy, but execution is decentralized across all branches of service and agencies.”
Donovan, while expressing admiration for White and Guetlein, voiced skepticism that their organizations could maintain such a compact size.
“Given all the accouterments associated with a four-star rank, I would posit that considerably more support staff are assigned to such a position than what [White] might suggest,” Donovan stated.
Harrison, however, contended that the fundamental nature of the DRPM role means these generals do not necessitate extensive personnel.
“They aim to make rapid decisions, and they can outsource much of the workload because they continue to leverage all existing program offices,” Harrison observed. “Truly, their function at this echelon is merely to facilitate decisions, tradeoffs, and resource allocation, not to undertake the implementation themselves.”
Indeed, White declared that rather than replicating the functions of established acquisition departments, his objective is to furnish those offices with “a degree of operational latitude in decision-making they’ve never encountered before, and I intend to empower them in ways they never deemed conceivable.”
In essence, Harrison articulated, the DRPM’s duty is to “invigorate” the framework: “Get it operational, set it in motion once more.”
Enduring Elements?
The precise manner and timeline for Pentagon leaders to conclude that the DRPMs have sufficiently energized the system, rendering them no longer requisite, remains to be determined.
Donovan expressed doubt that the positions would be as transient as White and Guetlein suggest, even though he did not question the men’s sincerity.
“I am aware that once an office or function is established, and personnel are assigned to it, particularly at the four-star echelon, it is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, in my estimation,” he commented, citing years of bureaucratic expansion within the Pentagon.
Kendall and Harrison, conversely, disagreed on the merit of DRPMs but both indicated that the DRPM reporting structure might facilitate their dissolution.
“There’s no genuine advantage to having it report to the deputy secretary, and the subsequent deputy secretary we acquire will undoubtedly reverse it and restore it to its prior state,” Kendall predicted. “I find it very difficult to envision anyone else attempting to manage programs in this fashion.”
“Because these report directly to the deputy secretary, I believe that when a different deputy secretary is in place, they may perceive this quite differently and not desire all these direct reports,” Harrison noted. “That’s why I do not foresee it being permanent.”
White, who served under Kendall until approximately 16 months ago, argued that the current deputy secretary is uniquely qualified to oversee this novel arrangement.
“The collaborative dynamic between him and me represents a paradigm that I believe can actually revolutionize acquisition,” White stated. “I am always circumspect when confronted with a new acronym purported to solve all problems. We are fortunate to have an exceptional cadre of leaders managing these initiatives. [Feinberg] is, first and foremost, one of the most brilliant individuals I’ve ever collaborated with. His commercial acumen is truly extraordinary … and secondly, in my three decades-plus of experience, I have never witnessed anyone commit time as he does.”
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