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Over one-third of the Air Force’s existing E-3 AWACS fleet has been deployed for the conflict with Iran, illustrating the Air Force’s exceptional airborne combat command contributions to the allied forces, especially as the Pentagon shows reluctance towards procuring the E-7, the intended replacement for that airframe.
Nevertheless, a recent research paper from the Center for a New American Security features an argument by its author advocating for the acquisition of the E-7 Wedgetail and similar systems. Philip Sheers, the author, states, “Specialized ABM aircraft ought to be regarded as a vital resource for U.S. military endeavors currently and for the foreseeable future.”
Officials at the Pentagon aimed to revoke the Air Force’s intended purchase of 26 E-7As, suggesting instead the procurement of an additional four E-2D Hawkeye aircraft, which are operated by the Navy, as an interim solution, while also considering future, unverified space-based targeting functionalities. Nonetheless, the Navy’s propeller-driven planes provide reduced sensing ability, shorter range, and less room for combat commanders on board compared to the jet-propelled E-7 and its more potent Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar.
Lawmakers allocated funds for the E-2s and prospective satellites but opposed attempts to abandon the E-7. Rather, legislators channeled $1.1 billion into the initiative to finalize two prototype airframes and requested an investigation into the matter. The previous week, Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink appeared uncertain when questioned regarding the E-7 during AFA’s Warfare Symposium, refusing to confirm whether the aircraft would be included in the fiscal 2027 budget proposal. He indicated that the Pentagon and Congress must still engage in a “dialogue” concerning the program’s trajectory.
Opponents of the E-7 contend that its cost is prohibitive and that specialized ABM aircraft cannot endure in disputed airspace, such as what the U.S. might face in a confrontation with China. Sheers conceded this point, observing that during a possible conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, “Chinese military assets—its substantial fighter fleet, intricate network of naval and terrestrial air defenses, and missile capabilities—will focus on eliminating U.S. ABM aircraft both airborne and on airfields.”
However, the CNAS study determines that possessing specialized ABM aircraft is too vital to abandon at this juncture, particularly given the primary objectives of the recent National Defense Strategy: safeguarding the home territory and preventing clashes in the Indo-Pacific. ABM aircraft provide a “mid-level” of command and control, he explained, merging the adaptability of an aerial platform with the organizational and analytical capacity of an operations hub to facilitate order within an intricate combat zone.
Within the Indo-Pacific region, “the extent of China’s counter-air menace and the probability of communication outages underscore ABM aircrafts’ capacity to detect threats promptly, reassign aircraft instantaneously, and function as an intermediate communication conduit crucial for sustaining cohesiveness and uninterrupted operations,” Sheers contends.
He further posits that ABM systems are more capable than terrestrial radars at overseeing “air-launched projectiles in addition to slower and low-altitude, air-breathing dangers” for the defense of the U.S. home territory, Sheers appends.
Although the E-7 or other ABM airframes are susceptible, Sheers proposed that they might be safeguarded with accompanying aircraft or uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft down the line.
Potential substitutes for ABM systems include targeting satellites, terrestrial radars, and the detection functionalities of sophisticated fighter aircraft, although these radars are tailored for the fighter’s deployment and do not match the capabilities present on the E-7.
Employing satellites for aerial and ground moving-target detection presents a hopeful, yet unverified, remedy, and commanders are concerned that latency—the possible lag in data relay—might degrade operational effectiveness. Moreover, airborne systems incorporate human personnel who oversee command and control, whereas satellites solely address the targeting facet of the mission.
“It is also crucial to stress that satellite sensors do not serve as combat commanders, and combat commanders will remain necessary,” Sheers penned.
Meanwhile, terrestrial systems are situated in static locations and are consequently susceptible to missile assaults, besides contending with certain aerial dangers. Fifth-generation fighter jets, despite being sophisticated, possess diminished detection capabilities and fewer personnel to process signals than a specialized system, thereby restricting their effectiveness for combat command beyond modest groupings of CCAs.
Collectively, Sheers noted, these options act as complements to airborne combat command systems, rather than immediate substitutes.
“Lacking an aerial detection and combat command echelon, the DOD hazards creating or exacerbating perilous deficiencies in the Allied Force’s capacity to handle threats and orchestrate unified reactions in critical situations,” Sheers ascertains.
Nevertheless, the requirement for aerial combat command is confronting the harsh truths of an obsolete, fragile, and limited E-3 AWACS fleet. The 16 remaining jets in the arsenal typically are approximately 45 years old and had a most recently reported mission readiness rate of 56 percent.
“Diminishing mission readiness rates have reduced the U.S. ABM fleet significantly below its objective, and a future fierce conflict would further segment the fleet between domestic protection and forward-deployed activities,” Sheers cautioned in his study.
In fact, that situation is unfolding currently; six of USAF’s 16 AWACS airframes have been observed in the Middle East assisting Operation Epic Fury targeting Iran this week. Committing 37.5 percent of the fleet to this endeavor underscores the worth Air Force personnel derive from the ABM assignment—and the scarcity of resources the Air Force possesses to carry it out.
The CNAS suggests in its study that the Pentagon “re-evaluate its comprehensive combat demand for ABM systems … and develop sufficient aerial capabilities to meet future detection and combat command needs.” Lawmakers, the study notes, ought not to endorse the “interim solution” of additional E-2s and should instead “persist in authorizing and allocating funds for ABM initiatives to avert capability shortfalls and foster robustness.”
Additional suggestions within the study encompass further examination of how aerial combat command would be utilized in the Indo-Pacific and how these systems could bolster the Golden Dome missile and airborne protection barrier for the domestic territory. CNAS additionally advocated for augmented funding to maintain and cultivate ABM aviators and personnel.
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