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Commanders from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve caution that the Air Force is obligated to update its fighter aircraft units concurrently with the Active component. Failing to do so could result in the departure of experienced combat personnel and render the reserve elements ineffectual for subsequent missions.
During a media briefing held in February at AFA’s Warfare Symposium, Lt. Gen. John P. Healy, who serves as the chief of the Air Force Reserve, indicated that more than 80 percent of the aircraft within his command’s inventory consist of older jets with limited remaining operational lifespans.
“I am fully cognizant of several of my units slated for retirement without any clear plan for renewal,” he stated. “One could argue I am persistent, even bothersome, in my efforts to guarantee the sustainability of this fighting force.”
“Some of these units are entirely composed of combat veterans,” he further elaborated, noting that the objective is “to prevent that expertise and skill from departing when a scheduled retirement takes place.”
A comparable predicament exists within the Air National Guard. Maj. Gen. Bryony Terrell, special assistant to the ANG director, highlighted that over half of the Guard’s fighter squadrons lack a definitive strategy for modernization.
“Thirteen out of our 24 fighter squadrons possess no advanced recapitalization blueprint,” Terrell asserted. “Some are designated to acquire older aircraft, and certain others have no identified successor platform whatsoever. The Air National Guard must undergo modernization in parallel with the Air Force—not afterward.”
According to her, F-16 squadrons situated at Atlantic City, N.J., Air National Guard Base; Buckley Space Force Base, Colo.; Joint Base San Antonio, Texas; and Morris Air National Guard Base, Ariz., all face the prospect of losing their aircraft.
Within the Reserve, as conveyed by Air Force Reserve spokesperson Sean Houlihan:
- The 924th Fighter Group at Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., concluded its A-10 operations in September, without a subsequent fighter assignment.
- The 926th Fighter Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., divested its final 10 operational F-16s by late 2025; and
- The 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., is projected to cease its A-10 operations by the conclusion of 2028;
Guard and Reserve leaders advocate for replacing these aging aircraft with modern F-15EX and F-35 fighters, emphasizing that the Air Force cannot fulfill its operational demands without their constituent parts. Air National Guard fighter units currently comprise 21 percent of the entire Air Force, contribute 30 percent of its combat strength, and manage 94 percent of domestic defense responsibilities. They accomplish all this while utilizing merely 7 percent of the total Air Force budget, according to a Guard fact sheet from 2025.
Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former Air Guardsman himself, acknowledged the Guard and Reserve’s input in Operation Epic Fury during his initial press conference following the commencement of the conflict.
“The integrated Reserve and National Guard forces have consistently showcased the inherent value of America’s Reserve Forces, encompassing the Wisconsin Army National Guard operating in Kuwait and Iraq, and Air National Guard contingents from various states, including Vermont and Virginia,” he observed.
Highlighting the Vermont Air National Guard’s 158th Fighter Wing, he remarked that its F-35 crews had been deployed for and participated in Operation Absolute Resolve against Venezuela in January, subsequently flying directly to the Middle East in anticipation of Epic Fury. These consecutive deployments underscore the pivotal role Guard and Reserve forces play in the Air Force’s overall structure.
A Persistent Challenge
Heather Penney, a past Air National Guard F-16 pilot and the director of studies and research at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, suggested that the swift reduction of the Cold War military—coupled with insufficient investment during the 2000s—set the stage for the current aging fleet.
“We arrived at this situation due to significant divestments in the 1990s,” Penney explained. “We halved the force structure and decelerated our recapitalization initiatives.”
Rather than procuring 750 F-22s as initially envisioned, the Air Force acquired only 187. Concurrently, counter-insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria intensified the need for airpower.
“We possessed a smaller force structure and had to employ it more intensely because of flight hours and operations in the Middle East,” Penney stated. “We prematurely shortened the service life of those aircraft.”
If a typical fighter aircraft’s operational life is 30 years, she noted, the expenses for its upkeep and maintenance begin to escalate around the 15-year mark.
Maj. Jonathon LaDue, spokesperson for the Air National Guard, conceded that the Guard’s Block 30 F-16s have a restricted remaining structural airframe life and will need to be retired within the next decade. Newer Block 40, 42, 50, and 52 jets, currently averaging 36 years of age, also face difficulties. Current projections aim to keep them in active service until approximately 2040, at which point they will near 50 years old, LaDue elaborated in an email correspondence.
“Fighters with a 50-year service life are not an adequate deterrent in the current and projected threat environments,” LaDue asserted.
Transferring older aircraft from the Active component to the reserve elements does not resolve the issue. The fiscal year 2026 budget proposal indicated that seven Guard wings would acquire post-block F-16s in the coming years. While this offers a temporary solution after legacy A-10 Thunderbolt IIs are decommissioned, LaDue stated that it “does not constitute a valid Total Force recapitalization or a lasting mission.”
Healy, the Reserve chief, has endeavored to obtain F-15E or EX jets to substitute some of the retiring aircraft in the Reserve. “For each of these ten units that are being phased out, I am exploring whether we can establish an F-15 unit in its place—be it a Strike Eagle or an EX,” Healy conveyed. “I am pushing vigorously. If we are divesting an F-16 unit, I desire an F-35 unit to succeed it.”
Photo by Jack Dempsey for Air & Space Forces Association
Reserve components are more economical than Active units, Healy suggested, claiming he can manage an F-16 unit for $12 million less annually than the Active force. Cost reductions are even greater for other platforms, he mentioned: $24 million less for an F-15EX unit and $28 million less than an F-15E unit.
However, regardless of the operational expenditure, the primary obstacle confronting the Air Force is the diminishing size of its fighter fleet. An August 2025 report submitted to Congress forecasted the addition of 300 advanced fighters by 2030, at which point the entire fighter force is anticipated to number 1,400 aircraft, 240 more than the current inventory. The conundrum lies in the Air Force’s stated need for 1,558 manned fighters to “successfully execute missions with high assurance and minimal risk.”
The Pentagon is anticipated to unveil its 2027 budget proposal later this spring and could potentially raise planned acquisition figures. F-15EX manufacturing is projected to reach 24 jets in fiscal year 2027, according to the Air Force’s report, and if additional appropriations become available, that number could ascend to as many as 36. Meanwhile, Air Force F-35 procurements have yet to exceed 48 in any given year, and last year stood at only 24.
Post-block F-16s will continue to undergo upgrades with active electronically scanned array radars, multifunctional information distribution systems, joint tactical radio systems, and integrated electronic warfare suites, as per the report, and later-model F-22s will also persist in being enhanced. Nevertheless, the Air Force has no intentions to
update its earliest Block 20 F-22 jets, which are presently not considered battle-ready.
Apprehension Regarding the Loss of Aviation Operations
This entire situation has Guard and Reserve commanders concerned about forthcoming aviation duties. Some units are already undergoing transformation for alternative purposes. In 2023, Mansfield Lahm Air National Guard Base, Ohio, transitioned from a C-130 flight unit to the 179th Cyberspace Wing. Back in 2019, the Puerto Rico Air National Guard’s 156th Airlift Wing, which previously operated C-130s, shifted to a contingency response and communications assignment, as documented by LaDue.
Furthermore, last year, the Maryland Air National Guard disposed of all its A-10s and converted into a cyber wing. Maryland is now the sole state in the nation without an aviation role within the Air Guard. Such a future could also impact other states.
“Without replacements, 12 Air National Guard fighter squadrons face the risk of losing their aircraft and flight assignments within the next five years,” states a 2025 ANG informational document.
Talent Departure
When a unit’s flying operations cease, the shift fundamentally alters personnel requirements.
“It truly is a massive transformation for everyone involved when flying is no longer the primary objective,” remarked Brig. Gen. Shannon “Sinjin” Smith, commander of the Idaho Air National Guard, sharing his personal viewpoint.
In a 2025 Mitchell report, Penney contended that the Air Force could ill afford to lose pilots from its reserve components, especially considering that the entire Air Force was already deficient by nearly 1,850 pilots. Unlike the Active force, which relocates Airmen when their units are disbanded, Guard members bear the responsibility if they wish to move for a new flying position elsewhere.
She posits that the Guard’s average retention rate of 89 percent over the past two decades has been vital for preserving core expertise within the service. She argues that dissolving units now will disproportionately affect experience levels throughout the Air Force. In contrast, the Active component only managed a 40 percent retention rate between 2017 and 2022.
“Most reserve component pilots possess more flying hours, sorties, simulator time, and deployments compared to pilots in active component squadrons,” Penney articulated. “Closing fighter squadrons within the reserve component will further strain the Active component.”
The repercussions of eliminating flying missions for the Guard and Reserve are more severe than for the Active component.
The Active Duty transfers personnel to the mission if a base shuts down, or a squadron is deactivated, Smith explained. However, when the mission is removed from a Guard or Reserve location, “most Guardsmen will not relocate for the new mission.”
Delays in reserve modernization also hinder the retention of Active-Duty talent within the Guard and Reserve.
“The likelihood of an F-35 pilot leaving the Air Force to join an F-16 unit is quite low,” Smith noted.
The modernization challenges affecting the Guard and Reserve are not confined to fighters, Smith stated.
“It extends far beyond fighters,” he emphasized. Tanker units and airlift operations encounter their own pressures, which, in turn, have a ripple effect on fighters as well.
“You can never station a fighter where it’s needed without airlift and refueling capabilities,” Smith said.
Another Mitchell assessment, published in 2025 by retired Col. John Venable and Joshua Baker, highlighted that replacing an Active squadron on deployment requires two Guard or Reserve squadrons. Meanwhile, 10 Guard squadrons will be held back for homeland defense during a major conflict, leaving the Reserve with only six deployable squadrons, Venable’s report indicates. Yet, realistically, only four Reserve squadrons could be deployed to support combat operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Much will depend on the Air Force’s success in augmenting its budget over the coming five years. Maximizing fighter production and capitalizing on cost efficiencies through multiyear contracts would be beneficial, though only over time. Concurrently, the Reserve cannot continue to divest without recapitalization, Healy asserted: “I believe we’ve finally reached a point where we’re halting that trend.”
Terrell stated that addressing the modernization gap will necessitate increasing F-35 and F-15EX acquisitions.
“If procurement expands, I think there’s going to be a more open and balanced strategy, and that’s what we’re hoping for,” Terrell said. “The crucial element, however, is to possess a plan. And as of now, today, we lack a comprehensive force recapitalization plan that includes funding. Consequently, year-to-year we’re endeavoring to ascertain how the Air Force intends to roll out these platforms.”
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