A recent unclassified wargame indicates that the U.S. Air Force, based on its current modernization trajectory, would not possess the capabilities to repel a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2035 or to conduct strategic attacks on mainland China during such a conflict. This assessment comes from an analysis of the wargame results, detailed in a report released April 9 by AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which organized the exercise.
The wargame involved approximately 60 participants, including Airmen, industry representatives, and allied officials. Its primary objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of different U.S. Air Force modernization pathways against a hypothetical Chinese invasion scenario.
Retired Col. Mark Gunzinger, who previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for forces transformation and resources and led government-sponsored wargames, acted as project leader for this exercise. He explained that the wargame’s “blue force” teams were divided into two distinct groups, each operating with different force compositions.
“Team Doolittle” represented a projection of the U.S. Air Force in 2035 if its current modernization plans remain unchanged. In contrast, “Team Mitchell” represented a more aggressive modernization approach. Notably, Team Mitchell’s composition included fewer total fighters but a greater number of bombers, Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, and E-7 battle management aircraft, alongside the introduction of a new sixth-generation fighter designated F-47.
Gunzinger, now the director of future concepts and capability assessments at the Mitchell Institute and a coauthor of the report summarizing the findings, stated, “The path the Air Force is currently on, it’s going to take you closer to the future force that Team Doolittle played in the wargame, not the more modernized Team Mitchell force.” He further emphasized the unanimity among participants: “It was crystal clear to the players which force they would rather take to fight, and that was absolutely unanimous across all players from all disciplines.”
Strategic Strikes
The wargame was structured in three distinct phases. The initial phase tasked the blue teams with deploying forces to deter and prepare to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2035. The second phase involved launching operations to counter an invasion and execute strategic strikes on mainland China. The final phase simulated a protracted conflict, assuming China continued military actions even after its initial Taiwan invasion.
Immediately, both teams encountered a significant challenge, described by Gunzinger as being “on the horns of a dilemma.” Deploying forces to U.S. bases within the first island chain, closer to Taiwan, left them highly vulnerable to heavy losses from China’s long-range missile forces, particularly for aircraft on the ground. Gunzinger noted, “Attrition on the ground was the most significant driver of both teams discussions and operational choices. Now, our assessment of the game results indicated that both teams would have suffered more attrition for red’s missile attacks than they would have from air engagements.”
Conversely, positioning forces outside or near the outer limits of China’s missile range significantly curtailed the teams’ ability to generate sufficient sorties. As a compromise, both blue force teams opted to forward deploy some forces while basing others further out. This strategy necessitated executing attacks in “pulses” rather than maintaining continuous pressure.
The two teams diverged in their operational approaches once conflict commenced. Team Doolittle’s force, characterized by a greater reliance on non-stealthy aircraft and standoff munitions, concentrated its efforts on defeating the immediate Taiwan invasion force. In contrast, Team Mitchell aimed to repel the invasion force while simultaneously retaining “enough F-47s, B-21s, and other capabilities to attack deep into China,” according to Gunzinger.
Gunzinger highlighted the critical difference: “Team Doolittle’s inability to generate enough long-range penetrating counter-air and strike stories, that was the most significant difference that affected their operational choices.”
Ultimately, the wargame leadership concluded that Team Doolittle’s strategy would likely prove ineffective, as China could continuously reinforce its invasion efforts from within its borders. Team Mitchell, however, potentially could have prevented a successful Taiwan invasion, partly due to its capacity for strategic strikes. Nevertheless, neither force was able to sustain operations in a protracted conflict scenario, with attrition rates deemed too high for the number of aircraft each could commit.
Gunzinger attributed this outcome to historical decisions, stating, “That’s the direct legacy of downsizing the Air Force’s combat inventories year after year over the last 30 years.”
Photo by Jud McCrehin, Air & Space Forces Association
Organic Kill Chains
Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost, deputy commander at Air Force Global Strike Command, likened the wargame to a chess match, observing that altering some “pieces” (force compositions) between the two blue forces fundamentally changed the entire game. He noted that this demonstrated “how you can get off the constraints of the board and move and maneuver differently, to not essentially join the game on the conditions or on the requirements of the adversary chosen.”
Armagost further explained that this concept is central to strategic strike. “What you’re trying to do through strategic attack is to compel an adversary to change their strategy, essentially to the defense, but then also to force their systems’ failure on their strategy,” he stated. “And so that strategic attack approach is a really important part of the conversation, because it has to arrive from a place of resiliency and a place of optionality, and that doesn’t come from building single nodal attack blue forces that invites counter-strategic attack that could then subsequently collapse as well.”
In line with this, Gunzinger highlighted a key takeaway from the wargame participants: the necessity to rebalance the Air Force’s “stand-in” and “standoff” forces. A force mix akin to Team Doolittle is deemed overly reliant on shorter-range, non-penetrating forces and long-range kill chains, which are more susceptible to disruption by adversaries. Team Mitchell’s force, with its B-21s and F-47s, demonstrated the potential to establish “organic kill chains” that are less dependent on external support systems.
The Mitchell report elaborated on this, stating, “During the … wargame, blue team players explored the potential for these next-generation combat aircraft to reduce the Air Force’s dependence on long-range kill chains and create innovative ways to defeat China’s counter-C3ISRT operations.”
The report concluded with a dozen recommendations derived from the wargame’s findings, all aimed at “rebuilding a balanced Air Force that has the capacity to win.” These recommendations span various areas, including procuring more B-21s and F-47s, enhancing air base defenses, balancing long-range and organic kill chains, and fielding a diverse mix of space-based and air-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
A significant overarching recommendation from the report advocates for a strategic reallocation of resources: “Overall, ‘the U.S. Congress and [Pentagon] should shift resources toward the Department of the Air Force and Department of the Navy by trading-off forces and capabilities—primarily from the U.S. Army—that will be less relevant in a conflict with China in the Western Pacific.'” The report further specifies that “These resources should include additional funding to allow the Air Force to defend its bases and operating locations in the Pacific’s first and second island chains.”
Lt. Gen. Armagost summarized the core message by referencing General of the Air Force Hap Arnold: “If you want an air force that is second to none, it must do two things. It must have range and striking power, and those two things in combination can be tested in a wargaming environment, can be tested as we develop doctrines and strategies to confront the world as it is.”
Why This Matters
The findings of this unclassified wargame by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies carry significant implications for U.S. defense strategy, geopolitical stability in the Indo-Pacific, and the future direction of military modernization. The scenario—a Chinese invasion of Taiwan—represents one of the most critical potential flashpoints in international relations, with profound economic, political, and security consequences worldwide.
Firstly, the wargame directly challenges the current U.S. Air Force modernization trajectory, suggesting it may be insufficient to deter or defeat a major adversary in a high-intensity conflict by 2035. This assessment could fuel debates within the Pentagon and Congress regarding defense spending priorities, procurement decisions, and the allocation of resources among military branches. The recommendation to shift resources from the U.S. Army to the Air Force and Navy underscores a growing recognition of the unique challenges posed by a maritime and air-dominant theater like the Western Pacific. Such a shift would inevitably lead to intense inter-service competition for funding and influence.
Secondly, the wargame highlights the critical importance of specific advanced capabilities, such as stealth bombers (B-21), next-generation fighters (F-47), Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, and advanced battle management aircraft (E-7). The distinction between “Team Doolittle” and “Team Mitchell” serves as a stark illustration of how different investment choices today could lead to vastly different outcomes on a future battlefield. It emphasizes the need for a force structure capable of not only defeating an invasion force but also conducting strategic strikes to compel an adversary to cease hostilities, rather than merely engaging in a protracted, attritional conflict. The concept of “organic kill chains” speaks to the imperative of reducing reliance on vulnerable external systems, thereby enhancing resilience against sophisticated enemy counter-measures.
Thirdly, the report’s focus on air base defense and the vulnerability of forward-deployed forces to long-range missile attacks is a crucial aspect of modern warfare in the Pacific. It underscores the necessity for robust active and passive defenses, as well as dispersed operations, to ensure survivability and the ability to generate combat power. The high attrition rates projected in a protracted conflict scenario serve as a sobering reminder of the potential human and material costs of such a confrontation, emphasizing the strategic imperative of achieving decisive outcomes quickly or possessing the capacity for sustained, resilient operations.
Finally, these findings have broader implications for U.S. alliances and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The ability of the U.S. to project credible power and protect its interests and allies, particularly Taiwan, is central to regional stability. A perceived weakness or inability to effectively counter an invasion could undermine confidence among allies and potentially embolden potential adversaries. Therefore, these wargame results are not merely theoretical exercises; they are vital inputs into the ongoing discourse about maintaining peace through strength in an increasingly complex and contested global environment.