In the preceding month, Iran’s Tehran Times published what seemed to be conclusive satellite evidence: a pair of images, before and after, of “American radar,” purportedly “completely obliterated.”
Yet, this was untrue. The photograph constituted an AI-altered rendition of a Google Earth image, taken a year earlier from Bahrain—an incorrect location, an erroneous timeframe, and manufactured damage. Researchers specializing in open-source intelligence swiftly exposed the fabrication within mere hours, correlating it with older satellite pictures and identifying identical visual anomalies, even down to vehicles immobilized in the very same positions.
This represented a minor act of misinformation, rapidly debunked. However, it highlighted a growing challenge during periods of active conflict: The satellite networks that journalists, analysts, pilots, and governments depend on to clearly observe conflicts in the Gulf region are themselves becoming contentious territory—subject to delays, deception, suppression, or simply under the command of entities whose objectives do not consistently align with public access.
This escalation coincides with heightened tensions among the US, Israel, and Iran, featuring missile and drone activities traversing Gulf airspace and involving regional infrastructure—including satellites and navigation systems—into the confrontation.
No Longer Neutral Infrastructure
When satellite data becomes unreliable, its governance emerges as a pivotal concern.
Within the Gulf, satellite infrastructure is predominantly managed by state-supported operators. These systems rely on geostationary satellites—positioned at a high altitude above the equator—which are utilized for functions such as broadcasting, communication, and weather prediction.
In the United Arab Emirates, this encompasses Space42, providing secure communications and Earth observation. Saudi-led Arabsat manages broadcasting and broadband services, while Qatar’s Es’hailSat facilitates regional connectivity. All these entities operate under stringent government oversight.
Iran is in the process of developing a comparable system. Its satellites, including Paya (also known as Tolou-3), are part of a broader initiative to independently expand surveillance capabilities, separate from Western infrastructure. The high-resolution Earth observation satellite was launched from Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome.
The commercial sector surrounding this infrastructure is experiencing rapid growth. The Middle East satellite communications industry is valued at over $4 billion and is projected to reach $5.64 billion by 2031, according to one assessment, primarily driven by airborne connectivity linked to both commercial aviation and defense requirements. Maritime platforms already account for nearly a third of the regional revenue.
Access Becomes the Primary Constraint
Commercial low-Earth orbit constellations like Planet Labs and Maxar operate differently from government-owned systems—and availability serves as the main limitation. Governments receive prioritized tasking, whereas news organizations and non-governmental organizations depend on paid subscriptions.
On March 11, Planet Labs declared an extension of delays on Middle East imagery by two weeks. The corporation denied that this decision stemmed from any governmental request, stating instead that it was to “ensure our imagery is not strategically utilized by opposing actors to target allied and NATO-partner personnel and civilians.”
Maryam Ishani Thompson, a reporter specializing in open-source intelligence, informed WIRED Middle East that “the absence of Planet Labs is so severe because we previously enjoyed a rapid refresh rate. Even if we turn to Chinese satellites, we don’t achieve that speed.”
Chinese platforms such as MizarVision, a Shanghai-based provider of open-source geospatial intelligence, have seen increased adoption since these delays—part of a broader transformation in who controls the imagery supply chain. Russia and China are also progressively sharing satellite access with Iran, meaning the companies that once dictated what the world could observe are no longer the sole entities with eyes on the Gulf.
If Verification Is Impossible, Challenging the Narrative Is Too
Operationally, the repercussions are immediate.
Ishani’s verification procedure relies on historical reference points. The static characteristic of the Tehran Times image—with vehicles in identical stances across both frames—was detectable precisely because journalists possessed recent imagery for comparison. Remove that baseline, and the same image becomes more challenging to discredit.
“In that ambiguous realm,” Ishani noted, “Iran is constructing its own fabricated narrative. If we cannot document it and fact-check it, they can persist in creating a narrative and disseminating it to their populace.”
Victoria Samson, chief director for space security and stability at the nonprofit Secure World Foundation, stated that, for most commercially and privately owned satellite companies, the US government is one of their largest clients—fostering “an unwillingness to displease the US government.”
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